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Abstract
We analyze Assessment Voting, a new two-round voting procedure that
can be applied to binary decisions in democratic societies. In the first round,
a randomly-selected number of citizens cast their vote on one of the two al-
ternatives at hand, thereby irrevocably exercising their right to vote. In
the second round, after the results of the first round have been published,
the remaining citizens decide whether to vote for one alternative or to ab-
stain. The votes from both rounds are aggregated, and the final outcome
is obtained by applying the majority rule, with ties being broken by fair
randomization. Within a costly voting framework, we show that large elec-
torates will choose the preferred alternative of the majority with high prob-
ability, and that average costs will be low. This result is in contrast with
the literature on one-round voting, which predicts either higher voting costs
(when voting is compulsory) or decisions that often do not represent the
preferences of the majority (when voting is voluntary).
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1 Introduction
How can the will of the majority in the citizenry be reflected in the outcomes of democratic
decisions? Turnout in elections tends to be significantly lower than the size of the electorate
and thus it is unclear whether the citizens casting a vote can be trusted to represent the
distribution of preferences in the entire population. As has been widely argued in the
literature, some citizens may not exercise their right to vote when voting is costly, with
such costs potentially affecting the election outcome (Ledyard, 1984; Palfrey and Rosenthal,
1983, 1985). There are many reasons why voting may be costly for an individual: going
to the polling station requires effort and is associated with opportunity costs, the need to
understand some details about the election process may discourage some citizens to vote,
or some individuals may be disappointed from repeatedly being in the minority.
When voting is costly, a balance is struck in equilibrium between such cost and the expected
benefit of going to the ballot box. Three stylized facts are then predicted by a major
strand of the literature on costly voting (see e.g. Bo¨rgers, 2004; Krasa and Polborn, 2009;
Taylor and Yildirim, 2010a,b).1 First, if at all, citizens vote for their preferred alternative,
and hence no strategic voting occurs.2 Second, regardless of the distribution of preferences
within the entire citizenry, both alternatives are expected to win with the same probability.3
Third, absolute aggregate turnout is bounded from above, regardless of the size of the
electorate. This implies that relative turnout decreases with the size of the electorate. The
voting procedure for which these three properties are derived is the standard and widely-
applied one-round voting, which is modeled by having all citizens (simultaneously) decide
whether or not to go to the ballot box, and in the former case which alternative to vote for.
The goal of the present paper is to show that within a costly-voting set-up, it is possible to
devise a different voting procedure which is superior to the standard one-round voting in the
following sense: the final decision will match the preference of the majority of the population
with a probability arbitrarily close to one, and, also in expectation, participation costs will
be similar to the participation costs in the (voluntary) one-round voting procedure. At the
1Most papers in the costly-voting literature analyze private-value settings. We refer to
Ghosal and Lockwood (2009) for a setting where preferences have both private- and public-value com-
ponents.
2This feature obtains even if there are more than two alternatives (Arzumanyan and Polborn, 2017)
and has empirical support in settings where voting is voluntary (Bhattacharya et al., 2014).
3While sometimes less stark, the underdog effect—according to which supporters of the minority alter-
native turn out in relative terms more than supporters of the majority alternative—is featured by most
models. Exceptions include the case where the cost is much smaller for the members of the majority and
the case where there is ambiguity about the true preferences of the electorate (Taylor and Yildirim, 2010a).
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same time, the suggested procedure is also superior to compulsory one-round voting, in
which case the alternative preferred by the majority is also chosen with high probability,
but at a much higher cost. As a matter of fact, we will argue that there is a sense in which
the proposed voting procedure can be seen as the right mix of voluntary and compulsory
one-round voting schemes.
Instead of having the entire citizenry vote at the same time, we suggest the following two-
round procedure, which we call Assessment Voting (AV in short):4
1. A number of citizens are randomly selected from the entire population, all of whom
constitute the Assessment Group (AG).
2. All members of AG (simultaneously) cast a vote for one of the alternatives at hand
or abstain.
3. The number of votes in favor of either alternative obtained in the first round is made
public.
4. All citizens who do not belong to AG (simultaneously) decide whether to abstain or
to vote for either alternative, and thus the second voting round takes place.
5. The alternative with the most votes in the two rounds combined is implemented. Ties
are broken by a fair toss coin.
Because AV serves the purpose of choosing one of two alternatives and is compatible with
basic democratic principles—every citizen is granted one vote—, it could be used both in
representative and direct democracies for any voting by the entire citizenry, such as the
referendum on Brexit.5 To be implementable in democratic environments, however, the
members of AG would have to be selected truly randomly and this group be large enough
to make the results of this first round representative for the entire electorate from an ex post
perspective—not merely ex ante. Moreover, both features should be common knowledge.6
By building on a sequential voting procedure, and due to a few other features that we
will discuss below, AV will be able to equalize the extent of the externalities that voting in
4For a verbal description, see Gersbach (2015).
5In Section 5, we show that Assessment Voting works similarly when there are more than two alterna-
tives.
6Given the unequal power that members of both voting groups have, distrust would emerge if citizens
were to anticipate that either the identity of such groups may be manipulated or the selected group may
not be representative enough (say, because the group is too small).
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favor of either alternative creates on its supporters.7 It is actually known from the literature
on costly voting that externalities generated by casting a ballot typically yield a welfare-
inefficient level of turnout. This phenomenon is at the core of the drawbacks of voluntary
one-round voting procedures, and is resolved by AV, which induces an endogenous level of
turnout that yields socially desirable outcomes.
To assess the properties of AV, we consider a model of a society that needs to choose
one of two alternatives, say A and B. Each citizen’s preference is private information
and is independently drawn from a given common distribution. We assume that ex ante,
it is more likely that a citizen prefers A to B than B to A. This means that A is the
desirable alternative from an ex-ante utilitarian perspective. For each citizen, there is
also a cost c > 0 of going to the ballot box. Such participation costs are private, but
they may also be considered in the societal calculus: from a utilitarian perspective, right
decisions should be met at the lowest possible average cost of participating in the voting
procedure, given standard democratic constraints such as the right of every citizen to vote.
Because we consider large societies, we assume that the number of citizens follows a Poisson
distribution—and hence our political game is a Poisson game (Myerson, 1998, 2000).8
The characterization of the equilibria of our sequential game is in general a complex task,
even if we focus on the customary type-symmetric, totally-mixed strategy equilibria. The
main reason for this complexity stems from the fact that for a two-round voting procedure
such as AV, the strategies of second-round citizens need to take the outcome of the first
round into account. In turn, the first-round voters face two sources of uncertainty: within-
round uncertainty (how will the other members of AG vote, if at all), and across-round
uncertainty (how will the second-round citizens vote in response to the outcome of the first
round and to the predicted votes of all other members of the second-round group, if at all).
In many cases, the above features yield a multiplicity of equilibria.9 Nevertheless, we shall
7A strand of literature on costly-voting has analyzed sequential procedures, with the focus on informa-
tion aggregation (see e.g. Battaglini, 2005; Bognar et al., 2015).
8The costly-voting literature has shown that Poisson games characterize the limit scenario where the
number of citizens goes to infinity (see e.g. Taylor and Yildirim, 2010b). Accordingly, considering a Pois-
son game does not drive our results, but it simplifies the analysis greatly. Recent papers that study
Poisson models are Campbell (1999), Hughes (2016), or Arzumanyan and Polborn (2017). Also recently,
Meroni and Pimienta (2017) have analyzed the structure and number of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
under different voting schemes.
9In some countries, unofficial voting polls are revealed before all polling stations are closed. This is
the case in Spain, where the official turnout rate is also revealed in the course of election day, from which
certain information about the development of the voting outcome can, in principle, be extracted. Our
analysis reveals that, even if we leave aside the strategic incentives of choosing the moment for going to
the ballot box, the purely positive analysis of sequential costly voting is a very difficult task.
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prove that if in the first round voting is compulsory—or is incentivated through subsidies—
and the size of the first group is sufficiently large, only one equilibrium of the subgame
starting after the publication of the first-round vote count survives: no citizen will cast
a vote in the second voting round. This implies that the outcome (i.e., the alternative
chosen and the costs of voting incurred by all citizens) is fully determined in the first
round. While this is admittedly a very strong prediction, it is reasonable to expect that the
main mechanisms underlying this prediction will also operate in real-world environments,
thereby giving considerable power of decision to members of the first voting group.10 If,
as already highlighted, the composition of this group is representative enough of the entire
citizenry, socially optimal alternatives will be chosen at a low societal cost, without the
need to deprive citizens of their right to vote: the low level of turnout in the second round
will simply arise as the result of a cost-benefit analysis made by the citizens participating
in this voting round, all of whom will be aware of the result in the first round.
As a consequence, in the case of AV, the two components of welfare will also be determined
entirely by the outcome of the first voting round. On the one hand, the alternative will
be resolved by the (random) composition of such group, and hence the probability that
the socially desirable alternative A will be chosen goes to one as the size of such a group
increases. What is more, the expected value of the distribution of the first-round vote
count difference in favor of alternative A (i.e. votes for A minus votes for B) will also
increase with the size of AV. This, in turn, will make it more complicated for any fixed
group of B-supporters to change the final outcome in the second round, thereby reducing
the individual incentives for each of them to go to the ballot box in the expectation that
the negative result from the first round will be overcome. On the other hand, there will be
no other costs associated with voting except the costs (or the subsidies) that are necessary
to make all members of AG participate in the election process. It turns out that if the
citizenry is large enough, it is possible to set the size of AV such that alternative A is
chosen with high probability and the voting costs remain moderately low. This follows
from the fact that the vote count threshold that discourages participation in the second
round voting does not change as the size of the entire electorate increases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the model is introduced.
In Section 3 we analyze the voting equilibria under AV. In Section 4 we explore if AV
improves welfare compared to one-round voting, whether it is compulsory or voluntary. In
10It is easy to verify that as long as the share of non-strategic voters—say those who always vote
regardless of any other consideration—is not sufficiently large (relative to the size of AG), the outcome will
still exhibit the same properties as in our baseline model, and hence the welfare conclusions will be very
similar.
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Section 5 we analyze some extensions of our baseline model—see also Appendix B. Section 6
concludes. The proofs of the main body of the paper are in Appendix A.
2 Model
2.1 Set-up
We consider a country—or, more generally, a jurisdiction—whose citizens have a right to
vote for one of two alternatives (or candidates), say A and B. Citizens are indexed by i or j.
There is a number p, with 1/2 < p < 1, such that citizen i’s preferred alternative is A with
probability p =: pA and B with probability 1 − p =: pB. While individual preferences are
private information, their prior distribution—i.e., the value of p—is common knowledge. If
citizen i’s preferred alternative is chosen, he derives utility 1, while he derives utility 0 if the
other alternative is chosen. This normalization is standard and does no affect the results.
On occasion, we may also say that citizen i’s type is ti = A (ti = B) when his preferred
alternative is A (B). Additionally, if i exercises his right to vote, he incurs a cost c, which
is additively subtracted from his utility. We consider that11
0 < c < 1/2. (1)
We summarize the citizen utility profile in Table 1.
i’s preferred alternative is chosen i’s preferred alternative is not chosen
i votes 1− c −c
i does not vote 1 0
Table 1: Voter Utilities.
11If c > 1/2, no citizen has incentives to vote at all. Assuming that c is common to all voters with
the same preferences is not a critical assumption, since we consider large populations, in which case
the incentives to vote are very small for those citizens with cost higher than the lowest one (see e.g.
Taylor and Yildirim, 2010a,b). Assuming that c is common across types of citizens will allow us to focus
on the differential effect of AV with respect to standard one-round voting procedures. Similar results would
nonetheless obtain in the case where the two types of citizens incurred different costs of voting.
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2.2 A new two-round voting
Under Assessment Voting (AV), there are two voting rounds. In the first round, a small
number of citizens are chosen by fair randomization to participate, all of whom constitute
the so-called Assessment Group (AG). That is, each citizen has the same probability to
be a member of AG. We let N1, a positive integer, denote the size of AG. All members
of AG (simultaneously) decide whether to exercise their right to vote or not, and if so,
which alternative to vote for. We assume that all members of AG are given a subsidy
equal to c, their cost of voting, so that voting in the first round becomes costless for them.
Whether members of the first round exercise their right to vote or not, they cannot vote
in the second round. In the latter round, only citizens who are not members of AG have
a right to vote. Before the voting in the second round takes place, the number of votes
that each alternative received in the first voting round is disclosed and becomes common
knowledge. Henceforth, we let d denote the vote difference between alternatives A and B in
the first round. In particular, if d > 0, A received d more votes than B from the members
of AG. The alternative that receives more votes within the two voting rounds combined is
implemented, with ties being broken by fair randomization.
We assume that the total number of citizens is N = N1 +N2, where N2 follows a Poisson
distribution with parameter n2, with n2 being a positive real number.
12 Then, we let
n = N1+n2 denote the expected number of citizens. Following Myerson (2000), the number
of citizens of type t in the second round, with t ∈ {A,B}, follows a Poisson distribution
with parameter n2 · pt. The properties of the Poisson distribution ensure that from the
perspective of a voter of type t, the number of voters of his same type also follows a Poisson
distribution with parameter n2 · pt. This will simplify the analysis greatly. Finally, we
denote by Ω1 and Ω2 the set of citizens of the first and second voting round, respectively.
2.3 Equilibrium concept and information
We study the existence and multiplicity of type-symmetric perfect Nash equilibria in our
voting game. By type-symmetric we mean that within each round, all citizens of the same
type use the same strategy. Moreover, we assume that if they do turn out, they vote
sincerely, i.e., we assume that they either vote in favor of their preferred alternative or
12This assumption is made for convenience, but it does not affect our results qualitatively. Alternatively,
we could assume that the total number of citizens N follows a Poisson distribution with parameter n. In
that case, for a fixed N1, the probability that there are not enough citizens to make up for the N1 members
of AG converges to zero, as we increase n.
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abstain. In the second round, sincere voting arises endogenously as in one-round voting
procedures already analyzed in the literature (see e.g. Arzumanyan and Polborn, 2017;
Taylor and Yildirim, 2010b). This follows from the fact that once the results of the first
round become common knowledge, voting for an alternative that is not one’s preferred is
a weakly-dominated strategy for any citizen. As for the first round, although we impose
sincere voting as an assumption of our model, it will turn out to be compatible with
equilibrium behavior.13 In combination with the subsidies given to members of AG, this
means that the first-round outcome, namely d, follows mechanically from the size of AG
and the value of p. The reason is that every member of AG will vote, and he will do it for
the alternative he prefers. Accordingly, let citizen i be a member of AG and consider the
following random variable:
Xi =

+1 if ti = A,−1 if ti = B. =

+1 with probability pA,−1 with probability pB. (2)
Then, d is the outcome of the random variable D defined by
D :=
∑
i∈Ω1
Xi. (3)
As far as the citizens’ strategic choices are concerned, we can thus focus on the subgame
starting after the first voting round and after the value of d has been made public, which
we denote by G2(d). For simplicity, we assume that the citizens who vote in the second
round can only condition their vote on their type and the observed value of d, since nothing
else is payoff-relevant. Accordingly, a strategy for citizen i is a mapping
αi : {A,B} × {−N1, . . . , 0, . . . , N1} → [0, 1].
That is, αi(t, d) indicates the probability of citizen i voting for his preferred alternative if
he is of type t and the vote difference between the two alternatives in the first round is d.
As is standard, we assume that there are mappings
αA : {−N1, . . . , 0, . . . , N1} → [0, 1] and αB : {−N1, . . . , 0, . . . , N1} → [0, 1]
such that αi(A, d) = αA(d) if ti = A and αi(B, d) = αB(d) if ti = B. That is, the probability
that citizens of the same type will turn out are the same. A strategy profile is denoted by
13This assumption is further discussed in Section 3.2.
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α = (αA, αB). Finally, we define dA = d and dB = −d.
3 Analysis of Assessment Voting
We start by analyzing the second round of AV, which is described by G2(d), and then focus
on the analysis of the entire voting procedure.
3.1 Second voting round
In the second voting round of AV, citizen i’s vote will make a difference in the final outcome
only if the votes—together with the abstentions—of the remaining citizens that have a right
to cast a vote in this round are such that:
• in the second round, i’s preferred alternative obtains dti + 1 votes less than the other
alternative, or
• in the second round, i’s preferred alternative obtains dti votes less than the other
alternative.
In the first case, i’s vote in favor of his preferred alternative ti will turn a defeat of ti into
a tie, while in the second case, i’s vote in favor of ti will turn a tie into a win of ti. In
both cases, (expected) utility increases by 1/2 if citizen i turns out and votes in favor of
his preferred alternative.
In the following, we investigate the totally-mixed equilibria of G2(d), i.e., we assume that
0 < αi(d) < 1 for i ∈ {A,B}. This type of equilibria is central in the costly-voting
literature (see e.g. Arzumanyan and Polborn, 2017; Taylor and Yildirim, 2010b). It will
come in handy to use xA := n2pAαA and xB := n2pBαB to denote the expected number of
votes for each alternative given strategy profile α. Note that it is equivalent to determine
the pair (αA(d), αB(d)) and to determine the pair (xA, xB) = (xA(d), xB(d)). We now derive
the conditions that make both type of citizens indifferent between abstaining and voting in
favor of their preferred alternative, thereby incurring cost c. First, we assume that d = 0.
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Then, we obtain the following two equations:
c =
1
2
∞∑
k=0
xkA
exAk!
xkB
exBk!
+
1
2
∞∑
k=0
xkA
exAk!
xk+1B
exB(k + 1)!
, (4)
c =
1
2
∞∑
k=0
xkA
exAk!
xkB
exBk!
+
1
2
∞∑
k=0
xk+1A
exA(k + 1)!
xkB
exBk!
. (5)
The first equation corresponds to the indifference condition for any voter i of type ti = A,
while the second equation is the indifference condition for any voter i of type ti = B.
Mathematically, the case where d = 0 corresponds to the case where there is only one
round of simultaneous, voluntary voting.14 By simple algebraic manipulations, we obtain
xA = xB = x, where
x ·
∞∑
k=0
x2k
k!(k + 1)!
= 2ce2x − 1
2
∞∑
k=0
x2k
k!k!
. (6)
The above equation has a unique solution in the unknown x (see Arzumanyan and Polborn,
2017). Second, we assume that d ≥ 1.15 Then, we obtain the following system of equations:
c =
1
2
∞∑
k=0
xkA
exAk!
xk+dB
exB(k + d)!
+
1
2
∞∑
k=0
xkA
exAk!
xk+d+1B
exB(k + d+ 1)!
, (7)
c =
1
2
∞∑
k=0
xkA
exAk!
xk+dB
exB(k + d)!
+
1
2
∞∑
k=0
xkA
exAk!
xk+d−1B
exB(k + d− 1)! . (8)
The following result, which is shown in Appendix A, demonstrates that the above system
of equations is incompatible:
Proposition 1. There exists d∗(c) such that for all d ≥ d∗(c), the system of equations
defined by (7) and (8) has no solution. Moreover, d∗(c) (weakly) increases as c decreases.
The negative result identified by Proposition 1 does not follow from the fact that the two
equations of the system are incompatible, but from the fact that each of them cannot
separately hold for values of d that are large enough. To show this property more clearly,
we assume now that d ≥ 2 and focus on equilibria of the following type: citizens of type A
vote with probability zero, while citizens of type B randomize. Note that because d ≥ 2,
an equilibrium where only citizens of type A vote with positive probability cannot be an
equilibrium, as alternative A will be chosen with certainty in the absence of any further
14When voting is compulsory, the analysis is almost trivial: all citizens vote for their preferred alternative
and they incur the cost of voting.
15The case d ≤ −1 can be proven analogously.
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votes.16 Hence, we assume that αA = 0 and 0 < αB < 1, and obtain the following two
conditions:
2c ≥ x
d
B
exBd!
+
xd+1B
exB(d+ 1)!
(9)
and
2c =
xdB
exBd!
+
xd−1B
exB(d− 1)! . (10)
The first equation guarantees that citizens i of type ti = A are content with their decision
not to vote, while the second equation is the indifference condition for any voter i of type
ti = B. We can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. There exists a positive integer d∗(c) such that Eq. (10) does not have a solution
for all d ≥ d∗(c).
We point out that the threshold d∗(c) of Lemma 1 is precisely the threshold used in Propo-
sition 1, and that we will use the same notation throughout the paper, including the Ap-
pendices. Furthermore, it is trivial to note that if d ≥ 2, there is an equilibrium in which
no citizen votes—we call it the no-show equilibrium. The combination of Proposition 1 and
Lemma 1 leads to the following result:
Corollary 1. If d ≥ d∗(c), the only equilibrium of G2(d) is the no-show equilibrium.
According to Corollary 1, if the absolute vote difference between the two alternatives in the
first voting round, namely |d|, is large enough, there are no incentives for any second-round
citizen to participate in the second voting round.17 What is more, this property holds
regardless of the (expected) size of the second-round voting group. An ensuing question
is what the outcome from the second round is when |d| is moderately low. We obtain the
following result:
Lemma 2. Given d > 2, there is c∗(d) ∈ (0, 1/2) such that for all c < c∗(d), an equilibrium
(0, xB) of G2(d) exists.
The above lemma complements the result of Corollary 1. While d∗ = d∗(c) determines the
size of AG above which the no-show equilibrium is the only equilibrium, c∗ = c∗(d) deter-
mines the cost level below which equilibria that are different from the no-show equilibrium
16If n2 is large enough, it can be easily verified that there cannot be an equilibrium where at least one
type of citizens votes with probability one.
17By symmetry, the case d ≤ −d∗(c) is analogous and hence the no-show equilibrium is the only equi-
librium.
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exist. It turns out—see the proof of Proposition 1—that for any given c ∈ (0, 1/2), there
exist constants K1 and K2, with K2 < K1, such that
(i) if d > K1
c2
, the only equilibrium of G2(d) is the no-show equilibrium, and
(ii) if d < K2
c2
, then G2(d) has equilibria different from the no-show equilibrium.
Hence, we can say that both thresholds are (approximately) tight, in the sense that d∗ ∼
1
(c∗)2
. In addition, it can be verified numerically that uniqueness of equilibria of G2(d) is
not guaranteed within all admissible parameter ranges, even if we only consider equilibria
of the type (0, xB). For instance, multiplicity of equilibria occur if we consider c = 0.2 and
d = 3. In this case, we have that (0, y1) and (0, y2) are equilibria of G2(3), where y1 ≈ 3.17
and y2 ≈ 3.76 are positive solutions of the equation 0.4ey = y36 + y
4
24
that additionally satisfy
the inequality 0.4ey > y
4
24
+ y
5
120
.18 This example shows that if |d| is moderately low, we
cannot uniquely predict the outcome of the second round of AV, if at all.
3.2 First voting round
Corollary 1 yields a very strong prediction: if d is above a certain threshold, no citizen
will vote in the second voting round. It turns out that by making N1, the size of AG,
large enough, the probability that d is larger than this threshold converges to one. This
is proved in the following result, which characterizes the outcome of Assessment Voting
(almost surely).
Theorem 1. For every ε > 0, there is N∗1 = N
∗
1 (ε, c, pA − pB) such that for all N1 ≥ N∗1 ,
the outcome of AV satisfies the following properties with probability at least 1− ε:
• All citizens of the first voting round vote for their preferred alternative.
• No citizen of the second voting round votes.
• Alternative A is chosen.
According to the above theorem, if AG is large enough, citizens who have a right to vote
in the second round are all discouraged from going to the ballot box. The logic behind this
18The same holds true if we restrict to equilibria of the type (xA, xB). Numerical examples for this other
case can be provided upon request.
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result hinges on the law of large numbers: because (i) alternative A is more preferred in the
society than alternative B, (ii) members of AG are selected randomly, and (iii) voting is
subsidized for members of AG, the difference in the first-round vote count for alternative A
with respect to alternative B increases with the size of AG, until the no-show equilibrium
is reached (with high probability). Moreover, this is the only equilibrium in the second-
round voting game (with this same high probability). The following corollary follows from
Theorem 1, and reveals how the size of AG should vary with respect to the most important
parameters of the model:
Corollary 2. Let N∗1 = N
∗
1 (ε, c, pA − pB) as defined in Theorem 1. Then,
• N∗1 increases if ε decreases, with lim
ε→0
N∗1 =∞,
• N∗1 increases if pA − pB decreases, with lim
pA−pB→0
N∗1 =∞,
• N∗1 increases if c decreases, with lim
c→0
N∗1 =∞.
The behavior of N∗1 with respect to changes in ε and pA − pB is self-evident: when either
the society is more divided (i.e., lower pA − pB) or we want to be more certain that the
voting outcome will be dictated entirely by AG members (i.e., lower ε), the size of AG
needs to be greater. Most remarkably, the above corollary implies that, ceteris paribus, a
lower size of AG is obtained when c increases. In particular, incentives for voting in the
second round are least significant for B-supporters relative to those of A-supporters when c
is (almost) equal to 1/2, in which case a smaller vote count difference from the first round
suffices to discourage voting. In this case, N∗1 may still be large, depending on the values
of pA − pB and ε. Note that N∗1 must be generally large enough to satisfy two objectives:
on the one hand, second-round citizens’ incentives to vote should disappear; on the other
hand, alternative A should be chosen with at least probability 1 − ε. It is also important
to stress that although N∗1 gives a sufficient condition with regard to the size of AG for the
outcome of AV to be described by Theorem 1, the discussion at the end of Section 3.1 shows
that this required size is (approximately) tight, in the sense that the desired outcome may
fail to hold for lower AG size. Finally, Table 2 depicts the value of N∗1 for some parameter
constellations.19
The numbers in Table 2 reflect the desirable size of AG for some particular situations.
We stress that members in this group will exercise their right to vote and that this hard
19We stress that the values depicted in Table 2 do not depend on the total number of citizens in the
population. We stress that in actual implementations, N∗1 should be chosen taking also into account that
the outcome of the first-voting round should represent the actual population.
13
pA − pB = 0.05 pA − pB = 0.15
ε = 0.1 146,049 45,945
ε = 0.01 152,788 47,160
c = 0.005 (with d∗(c) = 6, 367)
pA − pB = 0.05 pA − pB = 0.15
ε = 0.1 41,856 12,433
ε = 0.01 45,769 13,097
c = 0.01 (with d∗(c) = 1, 592)
pA − pB = 0.05 pA − pB = 0.15
ε = 0.1 3,003 455
ε = 0.01 4,858 668
c = 0.1 (with d∗(c) = 16)
pA − pB = 0.05 pA − pB = 0.15
ε = 0.1 2,476 293
ε = 0.01 4,319 498
c = 0.3 (with d∗(c) = 2)
Table 2: The (optimal) size of the Assessment Group (AG).
fact is very different from participation in pre-election polls, in which case cheap-talk or
other strategic behavior may lead to biased revelation of preferences (Agranov et al., 2017;
Goeree and Grosser, 2007). As a matter of fact, the literature on costly voting predicts
that manipulation of polls may have a strong impact on election outcomes, by triggering a
level of turnout in equilibrium that does not match the true preferences of the electorate
(Taylor and Yildirim, 2010a,b). Because AV is based on actual votes and not on reported
opinions, such a voting procedure should be more immune to this type of manipulation.
The reason is that as a result of the cost-benefit analysis of voting being equalized for
all citizens, the outcome of AV matches the prior distribution of preferences in the entire
citizenry (with high probability).
4 Welfare Analysis
Having characterized the (almost certain) equilibrium outcome under AV, a natural question
is what would be the welfare consequences of introducing such a voting procedure. Focusing
on expected average utilitarian welfare, there are two standard benchmarks, both of which
consist in a single round of simultaneous voting: first, voting may be voluntary; second,
voting may be compulsory.20 In both cases, we assume that the total number of citizens
follows a Poisson probability distribution of parameter N1+n2. Under one-round voluntary
voting, the analysis in Section 2 shows that welfare amounts to
W vol :=
1
2
− x
N1 + n2
· c, (11)
20The comparison between voluntary and compulsory one-round voting is the topic of Bo¨rgers (2004)
and Krasa and Polborn (2009).
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where x is the solution to Equation (6). Under one-round compulsory voting, it is easy to
verify that welfare amounts to
W com := wcomd − c, (12)
where wcomd is the expected average welfare obtained from the alternative eventually imple-
mented when the entire population, which has expected size equal toN1+n2, votes sincerely.
It is easy to verify that wcomd = pA · (1 − zcomd (N)), with limN→∞ zcomd (N) = 0. Moreover,
according to Theorem 1, there is N∗1 = N
∗
1 (ε, c, pA − pB) such that for all N1 ≥ N∗1 , with
probability at least 1− ε we have
WAV := pA − N1
N
· c, (13)
where pA coincides with the expected welfare obtained from the alternative being eventually
implemented when all members of AG (which has a certain size N1) vote sincerely. Finally,
a lower bound for (expected) welfare is
W := 0− 1 · c = −c. (14)
We will consider W to estimate welfare when our analysis does not yield clear-cut predic-
tions as to the outcome of AV. Our main result regarding welfare is the following:
Theorem 2. There are N∗∗1 (c) and n
∗
2(c) such that if N1 ≥ N∗∗1 (c) and n2 ≥ n∗2(c), we have
WAV > max{W vol,W com}.
Naturally, at the constitutional level, neither N∗∗1 (c) nor n
∗
2(c) could depend on the particu-
lar instances of referenda that would take place, which would be characterized by different
parameters, particularly by different values of pA − pB. Theorem 2 nonetheless indicates
that in large societies, AV will perform better on average than standard one-round voting,
whether voting in the latter is voluntary or compulsory. In comparison with voluntary
one-round voting, participation costs in AV will be of a similar extent, but decisions will
represent the population preferences much more accurately. In comparison with compul-
sory one-round voting, decisions will represent the population preferences equally well, but
participation costs will be much lower in AV. Hence, AV simultaneously exhibits the most
desirable properties of voluntary and compulsory one-round voting, and it can thus be seen
as an appropriate mixture of both approaches. It should also be emphasized that AV ex-
hibits the main desirable features of democratic mechanisms, including the fact that every
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citizen has a right to vote. This property adds to the appeal of this new voting mechanism.
What is more, alternatives that find little support in the citizenry are bound to be defeated
in equilibrium when AV is used. In direct democracies, this fact may reduce the incentives
to initiate popular voting on issues which are only supported by a small minority.
5 Extensions
The baseline model analyzed thus far can be extended in at least two sensible ways. First,
one may ask whether the prediction that citizens of the second round will (almost) never vote
if the size of AG is large enough hinges on our equilibrium concept, and very particularly on
the assumption that citizens of the same type all use the same strategy. Second, although we
have introduced AV for binary decisions, one may wonder about whether the performance
of this voting procedure (with respect to voluntary and compulsory one-round voting) is
maintained when there exist three or more alternatives. It turns out that the answer to the
first question is negative and the answer to the second question is positive. A comprehensive
analysis of both extensions can be found in Appendix B.
On the one hand, it is important to investigate whether the assumption that all citizens
with the same preferences use the same strategy does drive our main (negative) result—
namely that no equilibria differing from the no-show equilibrium exist if the vote count
difference in the first round is large enough (in absolute terms)—or not. Demonstrating
that this result holds even if we consider different (sub)types for citizens who have the same
preferences, with each subtype using a different strategy, greatly adds to the robustness of
our prediction regarding the outcome of AV. The proof—see Appendix B—is based on
properties of the Poisson distribution and the multinomial theorem. On the other hand, a
setting with three or more alternatives allows us to extend the application of AV from binary
decisions (i.e., referenda) to other decisions, say elections for executive offices where several
candidates compete. As mentioned in the Introduction, the case of multiple alternatives
has been recently studied by Arzumanyan and Polborn (2017). As in their paper, we show
that sincere voting—i.e., voting in favor of the preferred alternative—is consistent with
equilibrium behavior, although there may exist other equilibria.
Finally, we note that the robust result that identifies the conditions for which the no-show
equilibrium is the only equilibrium that will survive, provided that the vote count difference
is large enough, has been derived within the framework of AV. Nevertheless, our analysis
of game G2(d) could be applied to one-round voluntary voting procedures where one of
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the two alternatives, say alternative A, is the status quo, and the other alternative, say
alternative B, has to reach a qualified majority in order to be implemented.21 In that
case, not only would d typically be positive, but it would typically be very large if the
electorate were large itself. Our (negative) result would then imply that in settings where
voting is costly and the alternatives at hand only have a private value component, qualified
majorities might effectively protect the status quo in general, regardless of the support
such an alternative gathers within the population. We stress that under the standard (non-
qualified) majority rule, the literature on costly voting predicts the opposite: the status
quo and the alternative proposal will be implemented with the same probability, regardless
of the support that either alternative gathers within the population.
6 Conclusion
Most democracies, representative or direct, have faced important challenges recently. Some
of these challenges were due to inefficiencies of the decision mechanisms. In Switzerland,
for instance, the 100,000-signature threshold for popular initiatives is easy to attain, paving
the way for a misuse of popular votes as political mobilization devices. With more popular
votes in the form of referenda, organization and opportunity costs represent an increasingly
important factor to be taken into account.22 Facing more referenda also demands more
effort from the citizens themselves, especially in the case of decisions about which citizens
are ex ante poorly informed. Over and above these concerns, some of the referenda that
took place in the EU in the last decade have also demonstrated that sometimes decisions end
up being strongly dependent on turnout, a feature compatible with the outcome volatility
predicted by the literature on costly voting.
In this paper, we have advocated a new voting procedure, which we have called Assessment
Voting, that fulfills the most standard democratic requirements (e.g. one person, one
vote) and may be a partial remedy to the problems just described. The reason is that
Assessment Voting lowers the costs of popular votes and ensures (approximately) that the
majority/minority relation in the citizenry is reflected in the voting outcome. Although our
21A qualified majority imposes no direct requirement on the absolute difference needed between the
number of votes in favor of the alternative and the number of votes in favor of the status quo, but on the
relative difference. However, under the assumption that there will always be “by default” some share of
partisan citizens voting for the status quo, it does also impose a requirement on this absolute difference.
This allows the applicability of our analysis to this second set-up.
22For instance, information needs to be distributed to all citizens, with such costs being ultimately
financed by taxes. Moreover, campaign absorbs time from other governmental activities.
17
main analysis has focussed on binary decisions (i.e., referenda), we show in the Appendix
that the main mechanisms are at work with a voting on three or more alternatives. Because
Assessment Voting may yield more informed and less costly collective decisions, it could be
tested in democracies on an experimental basis.
Our analysis could be extended in various. First, we could consider circumstances where
citizens may have only partial knowledge about their own preferences. A sequential voting
procedure such as Assessment Voting opens up the possibility for new forms of information
transmission from voters of the first voting group to voters of the second voting group.
Second, in anticipation of the use of Assessment Voting, proposal-making may change.
For instance, proposals that have no chance under Assessment Voting (but do have one in
single-round voting) may not be made anymore. These issues are left for future research.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix we prove Lemma 1, Proposition 1, Lemma 2, Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and
Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 1: The goal of the proof is to show that there does not exist a non-negative
solution in y for the following equation if d is sufficiently large:
2c =
yd
eyd!
+
yd−1
ey(d− 1)! . (15)
We start by noting that the right-hand side of Eq. (15) is equal to 0 for y = 0 and tends to 0 as y
tends to ∞. Therefore, proving that Eq. (15) does not have a non-negative solution is equivalent
to proving that for all y ∈ R+, the left-hand side of Eq. (15) is strictly larger than the right-hand
side.23 To that end, we prove two auxiliary results. First, for a given d ≥ 1, we define
fd(y) := ce
y − y
d
d!
. (16)
We claim that
fd(y) > 0 for all y ∈ R+ ⇒ fd+1(y) > 0 for all y ∈ R+. (17)
For the proof of the claim, assume that the left-hand side of (17) is true. Then,
∂fd+1(y)
∂y
= fd(y) > 0. (18)
That is, fd+1(y) is increasing in y ∈ R+. Since fd+1(0) = c > 0, it follows immediately that the
claim in (17) is correct. Second, for a given d ≥ 2, define
gd(y) :=
fd(y)
ey
= c− y
d
eyd!
(19)
and note that
gd(y) > 0⇔ fd(y) > 0. (20)
Consider now the following claim, which we will also prove:
g∗d(y) > 0 for all y ∈ R+ for some d∗ := d∗(c) ≥ 1. (21)
23We let R+ denote the set of non-negative real numbers.
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By straightforward calculations,
∂gd(y)
∂y
= −y
d−1(d− y)
eyd!
.
It then follows that y∗ = d is the (global) minimum of gd(y) in R+, since
∂gd(y)
∂y
|y=d = 0
and ∂gd(y)
∂y
is negative for all y < d and positive for all y > d. We accordingly obtain that, for all
y ∈ R+,
gd(y) ≥ gd(d) = c− d
d
edd!
≥ c− 1√
2pide
1
12d
,
where the last inequality holds by Stirling’s inequality. Hence, a sufficient condition for the claim
of (21) to hold is that
c >
1√
2pide
1
12d
.
It is straightforward to verify that the righ-hand side of the above inequality is a decreasing
function of d, provided that d ≥ 1, and that, moreover, one that converges to zero as d goes to
infinity. Accordingly, we let d∗(c) be (uniquely) defined as the smallest positive integer larger than
one that satisfies
c >
1√
2pid∗(c)e
1
12d∗(c)
. (22)
Note that, in particular,
d∗(c) = Ω
(
1
c2
)
. (23)
All in all, we have demonstrated the claim of Eq. (21). Finally, let d ≥ d∗(c). Then, for all
y ∈ R+,
2c−
(
yd
eyd!
+
yd−1
ey(d− 1)!
)
= gd(y) + gd−1(y) > 0,
where the strict inequality holds by the Claims of (17) and (21). This completes the proof of the
lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 1: The goal of the proof is to show that the following system of equations in
(x, y) does not have a solution with non-negative components if d is sufficiently large:
2c =
∞∑
k=0
xk
exk!
(
yk+d
ey(k + d)!
+
yk+d+1
ey(k + d+ 1)!
)
, (24)
2c =
∞∑
k=0
xk
exk!
(
yk+d
ey(k + d)!
+
yk+d−1
ey(k + d− 1)!
)
. (25)
The system of equations is obtained from (7) and (8) by some algebraic manipulations and by
setting xA = x and xB = y. From the proof of Lemma 1, there is a positive integer d
∗ = d∗(c)
such that, for all d ≥ d∗ − 1, k ≥ 0 and y ∈ R+,
yk+d
ey(k + d)!
+
yk+d+1
ey(k + d+ 1)!
< 2c. (26)
Moreover, it is know from the properties of the Poisson probability distribution that
∞∑
k=0
xk
exk!
= 1. (27)
Accordingly,
∞∑
k=0
xk
exk!
(
yk+d
ey(k + d)!
+
yk+d+1
ey(k + d+ 1)!
)
<
∞∑
k=0
xk
exk!
2c = 2c,
where the first inequality is due to (26) and the second inequality is due to (27). This completes
the proof of the proposition, since (24) cannot be satisfied for any (x, y) with x, y ∈ R+.
Proof of Lemma 2: Throughout the proof, we have d > 2 fixed. First, we show that an equilibrium
(0, xB) of G2(d) exists if and only if Eq. (10) has a solution. It suffices to prove sufficiency, i.e., if
Eq. (10) holds for a given (0, xB), this must be an equilibrium of G2(d). Indeed, take the smallest
positive root of Eq. (10), which we denote by x∗B. Additionally, consider
hd+1(y) = 2ce
y − y
d+1
(d+ 1)!
− y
d
d!
and hd(y) = 2ce
y − y
d
d!
− y
d−1
(d− 1)! .
That is, x∗B is the smallest positive solution y of the equation hd(y) = 0. In particular, it must be
that
hd(x
∗
B) = 0
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and, by continuity of hd and the fact that hd(0) = 2c > 0,
hd(y) ≥ 0 for all y ≤ x∗B. (28)
Next, note that from Eq. (18) in Lemma 1, it follows that
∂hd+1(y)
∂y
=
∂
∂y
(fd+1(y) + fd(y)) = fd(y) + fd−1(y) = hd(y), (29)
where fd−1, fd, fd+1 were defined in (16). Hence, Eqs. (28) and (29) imply that
∂hd+1(y)
∂y
≥ 0 if y ≤ x∗B . (30)
Then, (30) implies that
2c− (x
∗
B)
d
ex
∗
Bd!
− (x
∗
B)
d+1
ex
∗
B (d+ 1)!
= hd+1(x
∗
B) ≥ hd+1(0) = 2c > 0.
As a consequence, Ineq. (9) is (strictly) satisfied for x∗B , and hence (0, x
∗
B) is an equilibrium
of G2(d).
Second, we show that there is c∗(d) > 0 such that an equilibrium of G2(d) of the type (0, xB)
exists for all c ≤ c∗(d). By the first part of the proof, it is sufficient to prove that such c∗(d)
exists guaranteeing that there is xB such that hd(xB) = 0, provided that c ≤ c∗(d). Indeed, let
c∗ := c∗(d) be defined as follows:
2c∗ =
dd−1
ed(d− 1)! +
dd
edd!
.
Then, for 0 < c ≤ c∗,
hd(0) = 2c > 0
and
hd(d) = 2ce
d − d
d
d!
− d
d−1
(d− 1)! ≤ 2c
∗ed − d
d−1
(d− 1)! −
dd
d!
= 0.
Hence, due to continuity of hd, the equation hd(xB) = 0 must have a solution. This proves the
result of the lemma.
We conclude the proof with a remark. If we apply Stirling’s formula to c∗(d) = d
d
edd!
, we obtain
c∗(d) = O
(
1√
d
)
. (31)
In combination with (23), Condition (31) implies that d ≥ d∗(c), with d∗(c) = Ω ( 1
c2
)
, is not only
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sufficient the result in Lemma 1 to hold, but it is also necessary. In other words, the difference d∗(c)
in the vote count d obtained after the first voting round must be achieved in this round in order
for the no-show equilibrium to be the only equilibrium of G2(d), the game representing the second-
voting round when the vote count difference is d. More specifically, for any given c ∈ (0, 1/2),
there exist constants K1 and K2, with K2 < K1, such that the following two statements hold.
First, if d > K1
c2
, the no-show equilibrium is the only equilibrium of G2(d). Second, if d < K2
c2
, then
G2(d) has equilibria that are different from the no-show equilibrium. The existence of K1 and K2
follows from Conditions (23) and (31).
Proof of Theorem 1: As already mentioned in the main body of the paper, we assume that all
citizens of AG vote sincerely, i.e., that they vote for their preferred alternative. Below, we show
that this assumption is also consistent with equilibrium behavior. Accordingly, the behavior of
any such citizen i is described by the random variable Xi—see (2)—, while the difference in vote
count for alternative A with respect to alternative B obtained in the first voting round is described
by the random variable
D =
∑
i∈Ω1
Xi,
which has been defined in (3), Ω1 denoting the set of citizens that belong to AG. Because E[Xi] =
pA − pB and Xi are i.i.d., it follows that
E[D] = N1 · E[Xi] = N1 · (pA − pB).
Recall that d∗ = d∗(c) has been defined in Proposition 1. This integer guarantees that if d, the
outcome associated with the random variable D, is at least d∗, the only equilibrium of game G∗2(d)
is the no-show equilibrium. In that case, the only votes are cast in the first round, and because
d > 0, alternative A will be chosen. Now, let
N∗1 = N
∗
1 (c, ε, pA − pB) :=


d∗
pA − pB+
ln 2
ε
(pA − pB)2 +
√
2d∗(pA − pB) ln 2ε + (ln 2ε )2
(pA − pB)2

 . (32)
Henceforth, we assume that
N1 ≥ N∗1 (c, ε, pA − pB). (33)
Then, we obtain that
d∗ − E[D] = d∗ −N1 · (pA − pB) ≤ d∗ −N∗1 · (pA − pB) < 0, (34)
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where the first inequality follows from Ineq. (33) and the second inequality follows from the
fact that N∗1 ≥ d
∗
pA−pB
, as implied by the definition of N∗1 in (32). Then, the following chain of
inequalities also holds:
P [D ≤ d∗] = P [D − E[D] ≤ d∗ − E[D]] ≤ P [|D − E[D]| ≥ E[D]− d∗] ,
where the last inequality holds due to (34). Moreover, by Hoeffding’s inequality (Hoeffding (1963)),
P [|D − E[D]| ≥ E[D]− d∗] ≤ 2exp
(
− (E[D]− d
∗)2
2N1
)
= 2exp
(
− (N1(pA − pB)− d
∗)2
2N1
)
≤ ε,
where the last inequality holds by (32) and Ineq. (33). Combining the last two chains of inequal-
ities, we obtain that
P [D ≥ d∗] ≥ P [D > d∗] ≥ 1− ε.
Accordingly, with probability 1− ε, no citizen will vote in the second round. Given this outcome,
citizens in the first round do not want to change their sincere voting decision. On the one hand,
all first-round citizens whose preferred alternative is A are content with their decisions as their
preferred outcome is implemented. On the other hand, all first-round citizens whose preferred
alternative is B would not obtain a better outcome by switching their vote towards A in the first
round, for this would only increase d. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2: Given the proof of Theorem 1—see (32)—, it follows immediately that N∗1
increases if either ε or pA − pB decreases. We now focus on changes on c. From the proof of
Lemma 1—see Eq. (23)—, we know that d∗(c) decreases as c decreases. Since N1 is increasing
when d∗ is increasing, the claim holds.
Proof of Theorem 2: Under AV, the average per-capita social cost of subsidizing is f · c, where f
is the expected ratio of the AG size to the total number of the voters
f = E
[
N1
N1 +N2
]
. (35)
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Since N2 is a Poisson random variable with parameter n2, we can easily obtain the following upper
bound for f :
f = N1 ·
∞∑
k=0
1
N1 + k
nk2
k!en2
≤ N1 ·
∞∑
k=0
nk2
(k + 1)!en2
=
N1
n2
·
(
1− 1
en2
)
. (36)
In particular, for a fixed N1, we have limn2→∞ f = 0. Next, according to Theorem 1, if N1 ≥
N∗1 (ε, c, pA − pB), the outcome will be fully determined by AG with probability 1− ε. Therefore,
WAV ≥ (1− ε) · (wd(N1, n2)− cf) + ε · (−c), (37)
where ε > 0 and wd(N1, n2) is the expected average welfare (in the entire population) obtained
from the alternative implemented when members of AG, a group of size N1, vote sincerely. It is
easy to verify that
wd(N1, n2) = pA · (1− zd(N1, n2)), (38)
with
lim
N1→∞
zd(N1, n2) = 0. (39)
Hence, there is ε∗ > 0 such that for all N1 ≥ N∗1 (ε∗, c, pA − pB), we derive from Ineq. (37) that
WAV > pA − cf + δ(N1, n2), (40)
where
lim
N1→∞
δ(N1, n2) = 0. (41)
Finally, because pA − pB > 0 and due to Ineq. (36) and (41), there must be N∗∗1 (c), with
N∗∗1 (c) ≥ N∗1 (ε∗, c, pA − pB), and n∗2(c) such that if N1 ≥ N∗∗1 (c) and n2 ≥ n∗2(c),
pA − cf + δ(N1, n2) > pA − c =W com
and
pA − cf + δ(N1, n2) > 1
2
− 2x
N1 + n2
· c =W vol,
where x is the solution to Eq. (6). In combination with (37) and (40), the latter two inequalities
prove that
WAV > max{W vol,W com}.
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Appendix B
In this Appendix, we extend the properties of AV in two directions: first, we analyze the robust-
ness of Corollary 1 when citizens with the same preferences use different strategies; second, we
investigate the performance of Assessment Voting when there are more than two alternatives.
Multiple citizen types
In the main body of the paper, we have assumed that all agents who preferred alternative A to
B used the same strategy. In particular, in our analysis of game G2(d), we considered that all
citizens played according to one of two strategies: αA for citizens whose preferred alternative is A
and αB for citizens whose preferred alternative is B. In this section, we assume that citizens of
type A and B may be of different (sub)types, which are given exogenously.
More specifically, for a given integer T ≥ 1, let ST = {(ρk)Tk=1|ρ1, . . . , ρT ≥ 0,
∑T
k=1 ρk = 1} denote
the T -simplex. Then, we assume that there exist ρA = (ρ
k
A)
TA
k=1 ∈ ST
A
and ρB = (ρ
k
B)
TB
k=1 ∈ ST
B
,
with TA, TB ≥ 1, such that any citizen i’s probability of being of (sub)type tkA is equal to pA · ρkA.
We shall assume that citizens of different (sub)types may use different strategies, i.e, they may
randomize between going to the ballot box or not, using different probabilities. Accordingly, we
have αA,k, with αA,k ∈ [0, 1], denote the probability according to which citizens of type tkA will turn
out (and then vote for alternative A). In turn, αB,k can be analogously defined for B-supporters.
By the properties of the Poisson probability distribution, in the second round of AV, the number
of citizens of each (sub)type tkA is a Poisson random variable with parameter n2 · pA · ρkA · αA,k,
which we denote by xA,k. Similarly, the number of citizens of each (sub)type t
k
B is a Poisson
random variable with average n2 · pB · ρkB · αB,k, which we denote by xB,k. We recall that d∗(c)
has been defined as the (minimal) threshold guaranteeing that if d ≥ d∗(c), no citizen will turn
out in the second round of AV. We can prove the following result, which generalizes Corollary 1
to a setting with multiple citizen types.
Proposition 2. Assume that there are TA (sub)types of A-supporters and TB (sub)types of B-
supporters. For any cost c, with 0 < c < 1/2, if d ≥ d∗(c), the only equilibrium is the no-show
equilibrium.
Proof. Let N denote the set of non-negative integer numbers. The fact that the no-show strategy
profile is an equilibrium is trivial, provided that d∗(c) ≥ 2. To show that this is the unique
equilibrium, we distinguish two cases.
Case I: TA ≥ 1 and TB = 1
For all voters of type A, regardless of their subtype, the indifference condition between turning
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out and abstaining is the following:
2c =
∑
(k1,...,kTA)∈NT
A
TA∏
r=1
xA,r
kr
exA,rkr!
·
(
xB
∑TA
s=1 ks+d
exB (
∑TA
s=1 ks + d)!
+
xB
∑TA
s=1 ks+d+1
exB (
∑TA
s=1 ks + d+ 1)!
)
. (42)
Nevertheless, by Ineq. (26)—see the proof of Proposition 1—, we obtain that for all d ≥ d∗(c)
and all xB ∈ R+,
∑
(k1,...,kTA)∈NT
A
TA∏
r=1
xA,r
kr
exA,rkr!
·
(
x
∑TA
s=1 ks+d
B
exB (
∑TA
s=1 ks + d)!
+
x
∑TA
s=1 ks+d+1
B
exB (
∑TA
s=1 ks + d+ 1)!
)
<
∑
(k1,...,kTA)∈NT
A
TA∏
r=1
xA,r
kr
exA,rkr!
· 2c = 2c, (43)
where the second inequality holds from the claim that
∑
(k1,...,kTA)∈NT
A
TA∏
r=1
xkrA,r
exA,rkr!
= 1. (44)
Assuming Eq. (44), Eq. (42) does not have a solution, and hence there cannot be an equilibrium
of game G2(d) in which A-supporters are split into TA (sub)types and each (sub)type trA of citizen
plays according to a totally-mixed strategy xA,r. Finally, it only remains to prove Eq. (44). We
prove the claim by induction on TA. The case TA = 1 holds directly from the properties of the
Poisson probability distribution. Hence, assume that Eq. (44) holds for some TA ≥ 1. Then,
∑
(k1,...,kTA+1)∈NT
A+1
TA+1∏
r=1
xkrA,r
exA,rkr!
=
∞∑
k=0


∑
(k1,...,kTA+1)∈N
TA+1,
k
TA+1
=k

TA∏
r=1
xkrA,r
exA,rkr!
·
xk
A,TA+1
exA,TA+1k!




=
∞∑
k=0

 xkA,TA+1
exA,TA+1k!
∑
(k1,...,kTA)∈NT
A
TA∏
r=1
xkrA,r
exA,rkr!


=
∞∑
k=0
xk
A,TA+1
exA,TA+1k!
= 1,
where the penultimate equality holds by induction and the last equality holds due to the properties
of the Poisson probability distribution.
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Case II: TA ≥ 1 and TB ≥ 1
Let us assume TA is given. We introduce further notation. Given xB = (xB,1, ..., xB,TB ) and k
B =
(kB1 , ..., k
B
TB
), we let P (xB , k
B) denote the probability that, for each (sub)type tBs (s = 1, . . . , T
B),
there are exactly kBs citizens of this (sub)type that vote, provided that citizens of type t
s
B use
strategy αB,s (which leads to xB,s). Because (sub)types are drawn independently, we obtain
P (xB , k
B) =
TB∏
s=1
x
kBs
B,s
exB,skBs !
.
Moreover, because of the multinomial theorem, we obtain that for all m ≥ 0,
∑
(
kB1 ,...,k
B
TB
)
∈NT
B
,
∑TB
s=1 k
B
s =m
P (xB , k
B) =
(∑TB
s=1 xB,s
)m
e
∑TB
s=1 xB,sm!
. (45)
For all voters of type A, the indifference condition between turning out and abstaining is
2c =
∑
(
kA1 ,...,k
A
TA
)
∈NTA
TA∏
r=1
xA,r
kAr
exA,rkAr !
·


∑
kB=
(
kB1 ,...,k
B
TB
)
∈NT
B
,
∑TB
s=1 k
B
s =
∑TA
s=1 k
A
s +d
P (xB , k
B) +
∑
kB=
(
kB1 ,...,k
B
TB
)
∈NT
B
,
∑TB
s=1 k
B
s =
∑TA
s=1 k
A
s +d+1
P (xB , k
B)


=
∑
(
kA1 ,...,k
A
TA
)
∈NTA
TA∏
r=1
xA,r
kAr
exA,rkAr !
·


(∑TB
s=1 xB,s
)∑TA
s=1 k
A
s +d
e
∑TB
s=1 xB,s
(∑TA
s=1 k
A
s + d
)
!
+
(∑TB
s=1 xB,s
)∑TA
s=1 k
A
s +d+1
e
∑TB
s=1 xB,s
(∑TA
s=1 k
A
s + d+ 1
)
!


=
∑
(
kA1 ,...,k
A
TA
)
∈NTA
TA∏
r=1
xA,r
kAr
exA,rkAr !
·

 σ
∑TA
s=1 k
A
s +d
B
eσB
(∑TA
s=1 k
A
s + d
)
!
+
σ
∑TA
s=1 k
A
s +d+1
B
eσB
(∑TA
s=1 k
A
s + d+ 1
)
!

 < 2c,
where σB :=
∑TB
s=1 xB,s, the second equality follows from Eq. (45), and the inequality follows from
Ineq. (43) if d ≥ d∗(c). Because we have reached a contradiction, it must be that if d ≥ d∗(c),
there cannot exist an equilibrium of game G2(d) in which A-supporters are split into TA (sub)types
and each (sub)type trA of citizen plays according to a totally-mixed strategy xA,r, and in which
B-supporters are split into TB (sub)types and each (sub)type trB of citizen plays according to a
totally-mixed strategy xB,r. This completes the proof.
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24The case in which some (sub)types play according to pure strategies can be proved analogously to the
case considered here. We also note that although we have focussed on the case where TA and TB are finite
numbers, the claim of Proposition 2 can be extended to the case where TA or TB are infinite.
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Three or more alternatives
In this section, we analyze the case of three or more alternatives. As already mentioned in
the Introduction, this case has been analyzed by Arzumanyan and Polborn (2017) for one-round
voluntary voting. We build on their approach to analyze AV. Specifically, we show that the
negative result identified by Corollary 1 holds, regardless of the number of alternatives at hand.
That is, we show that there is a threshold—which coincides with d∗( c2) such that there is an
equilibrium of the second-round voting game in which no citizen turns out, provided that the vote
count difference in the first voting round is sufficiently large.25
Accordingly, suppose there is a set of m alternatives A1, A2, ..., Am, denoted by A. Citizens are
of one of m! possible types (A1, A2, ..., Am), ..., (Am, Am−1, ..., A1), where type (Ai1Ai2 , ..., Aim)
stands for the citizen whose most preferred alternative is Ai1 , the second most preferred alternative
is Ai2 , and so on. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are V1, . . . , Vm such that each
citizen i derives a utility level Vj if his j
th best alternative wins. Without loss of generality we
impose the normalization 1 = V1 ≥ V2 ≥ ... ≥ Vm = 0.
As in the case of two alternatives, we assume that the number of citizens of each type (Ai1 , Ai2 , ..., Aim)
is distributed according to a Poisson random variable with parameter pi1,i2,...,im. As for the solu-
tion concept, we assume that (Ai1 , ..., Aim)-citizens who turn out vote for alternative Aij , where
1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, with probability piji1,i2,...,im. These probabilities are exogenously given and satisfy
m−1∑
j=1
p
ij
i1,i2,...,im
= 1.
In particular, we assume that citizens never vote for their least preferred alternative—this as-
sumption generalizes sincere voting in a framework with at least three alternatives.
Accordingly, we obtain that the number of voters in favor of alternative Aj is distributed as a
Poisson random variable (with parameter denoted by ηj), since it is a sum of independent Poisson
random variables. As a tie-breaking rule, we consider that if there are k alternatives with the same
number of votes combined in the two voting rounds and if the remaining alternatives have strictly
fewer votes, the alternative that wins is chosen among these k alternatives, each alternative having
probability 1
k
.
Next, suppose that alternative Ai has received ai votes in the first voting round. We can assume
that a1 ≤ a2 ≤ ... ≤ am without loss of generality. Finally, we let Gm(d) denote the modification
of G2(d), so that citizens can now vote for any of the m alternatives in any voting round. We have
the following proposition:
25We cannot rule out the possibility that equilibria may also exist in which strategic voting occurs in
the first voting round. One-round voting mechanisms also have the same drawback.
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Proposition 3. For any c and any vector of votes (a1, a2, ..., am) after the first voting round,
there is d∗∗(c) large enough, such that if am− am−1 ≥ d∗∗(c), the only equilibrium of game Gm(d)
is the no-show equilibrium in the second round.
Proof. The proof is based on an induction on m. The case m = 2 is proven in Corollary 1. Now
suppose that the claim of the proposition is true for the case of m− 1 alternatives, and consider
the case of m alternatives. In particular, we will show that no citizen will vote for alternative A1
in any equilibrium of game Gm(d), where A1 is the alternative that received the lowest number of
votes in the first voting round. This means that instead of m alternatives, it is as if there were
only m − 1 alternatives, A2, . . . , Am. Because am − am−1 ≥ d∗∗(c), we obtain by induction that
the only equilibrium that survives is the no-show equilibrium.
We distinguish two cases, which correspond to the cases in which one more vote in the second
voting round in favor of alternative A1 will make a difference in the final outcome. In both cases,
we let i be a citizen of type (A1, Ai2 , ..., Ain). It will suffice to consider this type of citizen.
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Case I: In the two voting rounds combined, alternative A1 received exactly the same number of
votes as each of the alternatives of a given (non-empty) set B, with all alternatives in A\(B∪{A1})
receiving strictly fewer total votes than those in B.
In this case, with one additional vote in the second voting round, A1 will win without ties.
Accordingly, the expected gain that citizen i derives from voting for A1 in the second round is
equal to
H(B) := 1− 1
1 + |B| ·

1 +∑
j∈B
Vj

 .
Let x denote the total number of votes received by A1 and alternatives from B in the two voting
rounds combined. It is straightfoward to verify that x ≥ am, because alternative Am already has
am votes from the first round (the highest number among all alternatives). Then, the probability
of having an alternative of set B winning the voting after both rounds (excluding i’s vote) is
Pequal(B) :=
∞∑
x=am

 ∏
j∈B∪{A1}
η
x−aj
j
eηj (x− aj)! · P (x,A \ (B ∪ {A1}))

 ,
where P (x,S) denotes the probability that alternatives in set S all receive strictly fewer votes
than x. Let s denote the size of any arbitrary set S. It is easy to verify the following:
P (x,S) =
∑
(l1,...,ls)∈Ns,
lj+asj<x,j=1,...,s
s∏
r=1
ηlrsr
eηsr lr!
. (46)
26The argument of the proof can be easily adapted for all other types of citizens.
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Case II: In the two voting rounds combined, alternative A1 received one vote less than each of the
alternatives of a given (non-empty) set C, with all alternatives in A\ (C ∪ {A1}) receiving strictly
fewer total votes than those in C.
In this case, with one additional vote in the second voting round, there is a chance that A1 will
be chosen. Accordingly, the expected gain that citizen i derives from voting in the second round
in favor of A1 is equal to
F (B) := 1
1 + |C| ·

1 +∑
j∈C
Vj

− 1|C| ·
∑
j∈C
Vj ,
which is always a non-negative number since maxj∈CVj ≤ 1. Let x+ 1 now denote the number of
total votes received by each of the alternatives in set C in the two voting rounds combined. That is,
alternative A1 has received x votes in both rounds combined, and it must be that x ≥ am. Then,
the probability of having an alternative of set C winning the voting after both rounds (excluding
i’s vote) is
Plow(C) :=
∞∑
x=am
(
ηx−a11
eη1(x− a1)! ·
∏
j∈C
η
x+1−aj
j
eηj (x+ 1− aj)! · P (x,A \ (C ∪ {A1}))
)
,
where P (x, S) has been defined in Eq. (46).
Finally, let 2A denote the power set of A. Then, the indifference condition for citizen i that
equalizes the expected gain of voting for alternative A1 and the cost of voting is
c =
∑
B∈2A\{A1}\∅
Pequal(B) ·H(B) +
∑
C∈2A\{A1}\∅
Plow(C) · F (C). (47)
By Ineq. (26)—see the proof of Proposition 1—, if d ≥ d∗∗(c) and for all y ∈ R+ and k ≥ 0, it
holds that
yk+d
ey(k + d)!
<
c
2
, (48)
If we now assume that am − a1 ≥ d∗∗(c), then because H(B) and F (C) are at most one and all
the events described in the calculations of Pequal and Plow are disjoint, we have:
∑
B∈2A\{A1}\∅
Pequal(B) ·H(B) +
∑
C∈2A\{A1}\∅
Plow(C) · F (C)
≤

 ∑
B∈2A\{A1}\∅
Pequal(B) +
∑
C∈2A\{A1}\∅
Plow(C)

 ≤
(
∞∑
x=am
ηx−a11
eη1(x− a1)! · (P1(x) + P2(x))
)
< c,
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where the strict inequality holds by Ineq. (48), and we also have that
∞∑
x=am
P1(x) ≤ 1 and
∞∑
x=am
P2(x) ≤ 1.
That is, Eq. (47) cannot hold if am − a1 is above a certain threshold, which in fact coincides
with d∗( c2 ), and thereby is approximately four times bigger than d
∗(c). Letting d∗∗(c) = d∗( c2)
concludes the proof.
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